Understanding the genesis of the Electoral College requires understanding its historical context. The Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, purported to bind the 13 original states into a nation, but in truth, each state remained independent and sovereign. The so-called national government was denied such powers as the authority to levy taxes and regulate commerce.
By the spring of 1787, Revolutionary War heroes led by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton became so disgusted with their new nation’s governance that they organized a “convention” in Philadelphia, ostensibly to amend the Articles of Confederation, but in reality to invent and agree to an entirely new form of government. However, arrayed against them was a not insignificant cadre including such revolutionary luminaries as Patrick Henry. The Hamilton group, known as “The Federalists,” favored a strong central government with limited popular participation; the Henry group, known as the “The Anti-Federalists,” were adamant in their opposition.
There was also the poisonous issue of slavery. Slaves accounted for 40 percent of the South’s population, and North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia refused to join any union unless their “peculiar institution” was accommodated.
The convention opened on May 26, 1787 and continued until September 28. The overarching imperative was to obtain the consent of all 13 states. Compromises had to be found. Those they reached included the invention of the Electoral College.
The slavery issue was dealt with early in the convention. Its unique resolution was to permit slaves, who obviously could not vote, to be counted as three-fifths of a person for the purpose of counting population in apportioning how many members of the House of Representatives would be allowed for each state. This arrangement, of course, eventually affected the number of electors for each southern state, but it did not cause the invention of the Electoral College. To think otherwise commits the logical fallacy of “post hoc ergo propter hoc” (after this, therefore on account of this).
Not until late in the convention’s deliberations did the delegates finally deal with the question of choosing the president. By that time, the three-fifths rule had long been embedded in the draft constitution.
Strikingly, election of the president by the people was an early and, seemingly, desirable choice. It was backed by some influential delegates. For example, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania stated, “If the president is to be the guardian of the people, let him be appointed by the people.”
However, opponents of the popular vote were relentless, led by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts (of “gerrymandering” fame) who argued that “the people are uninformed and would be misled by a few designing men.” In the end, Gerry and his followers prevailed and the popular vote for president was defeated, with only Pennsylvania and Delaware dissenting.
Having disposed of that matter, the convention moved on, and, for a while, electing the president by the Congress gained ascendency; after all, the legislatures of most states then elected their governors. But, ultimately, its defeat was led by Pennsylvania’s Gouverneur Morris who successfully argued that such a plan would make the president subservient to Congress and thus pervert the Constitution’s fundamental concept of separation of powers.
Now deadlocked, the convention appointed a committee of 11 delegates. They were directed to find a compromise that would achieve the convention’s imperative of unanimity. They achieved that goal. They invented, proposed, and ultimately secured the adoption of the Electoral College. It and the Constitution of which it is a part preserved the power of smaller states, and popular voting was limited to the House of Representatives because state legislatures would elect senators as well as control the selection of presidential electors.
The Electoral College thus exacerbated the fundamental differences between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Federalist paper 68 argues that a president should be chosen by “men most capable of analyzing (his) qualities” rather than elevating a man with “talents for low intrigue and the little acts of popularity.”
Anti-Federalists were equally concerned about electing a demagogue. Anti-Federalist paper 72 argued that it was terribly wrong that the sacred rights of mankind should “dwindle down to electors” because there is “but one source of right to government, or any branch of it, and that is THE PEOPLE” (emphasis in original). Otherwise, the Paper foresaw, the Constitution created a president with such vast powers that he might, one day, “perpetuate his own personal administration” and “give us law at the bayonet’s point”.
Was that all too predictive of what we have today?
Sherwin Markman, a graduate of the Yale Law School, lives in Rock Hall, Maryland. He served as an assistant to President Lyndon Johnson, after which was a trial lawyer in Washington, D.C. He has published several books, including one dealing with the Electoral College. He has also taught and lectured about the American political system.